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ABSTRACT 
 
Most literature on gender differences in the field of economics suggests that women 
are more risk averse and less trustful than men and, in the context of a dictator game, 
women seem to be less selfish, more reciprocal and more concerned by fairness and 
altruism than men. In this dissertation, a survey is carried out in order to test the 
existence of gender differences regarding fairness and altruism in the context of a 
dictator game. The survey is based on the setting of the experiment included in the 
study by Eckel and Grossman (1996b). The results show, contrary to the general 
perception, that women are more selfish than men, and less altruistic. Moreover, 
fairness is a principle for them, as they will always or never be fair regardless of the 
circumstances surrounding the decision. 
JEL Codes: A13, C83, C91 
Keywords: Fairness, altruism, punishment, gender, dictator game. 
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FAIRNESS AND ALTRUISM IN THE CONTEXT OF A 
PUNISHMENT GAME: A GENDER APPROACH 
1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation aims at testing the existence of gender differences related to 
fairness and altruism in the context of a dictator game, as well as to the willingness to 
punish unfair subjects. Specifically, these ideas are examined through the replication of 
an experiment already carried out and published, in order to test the results derived 
from it, as well as to provide new findings inferred from the variations included in the 
design. 
The personal motivation to perform this work is to make a first approach to the 
experimental methodology, particularly to the topics of gender differences and altruism 
or fairness concerns. These issues are of great interest in the field of Economics and, 
in recent years, quite a lot of research has been done on them. That is the reason why 
it is interesting the replication of a study already carried out in order to check the 
consistency of the results and to include additional conditions so as to derive new 
conclusions. Furthermore, this project allows the broadening of knowledge about a 
more specific area of economics, in particular regarding Game Theory and Behavioural 
Economics, making feasible at the same time the implementation in practice of 
theoretical notions acquired throughout the degree of Economics. 
Regarding experimental economics, bargaining is one of the main areas of study, of 
which several experiments have been carried out over the years, and which implies a 
huge range of everyday life situations. Some examples which illustrate a bargaining 
process are the following ones: the decision of a labour market reform between 
employers and unions, the negotiation of the wage between employers and employees 
for the latter, the divorce agreement of a couple, or even simpler, the bargaining 
process between an individual and a telecommunications company. 
There are other situations in which there is just one person (part) who makes a 
decision that will affect both parts participating in the interaction, while the other one 
has no bargaining power at all. This is the setting of the so-called dictator game, very 
much related to the present research. The dictator game is a kind of interaction in 
which two subjects participate, but only one of them makes a decision; that is, the 
dictator, who has to decide the division of a determined amount of money between 
him/her and the other player, who cannot reject the offer. In equilibrium, the theory 
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predicts that the proposer or dictator offers zero to the responder, who has no other 
choice than accepting it.  
The simplicity of this game facilitates its implementation in the laboratory, but the 
theoretical prediction is not fulfilled in this context, that is to say, playing in the lab with 
real money. Moreover, Guala and Mittone (2010, p.578) affirm that the interaction 
between subjects is nearly non-existent, so that the term “game” may not be accurate 
when defining this situation. 
The present project is based on the study by Eckel and Grossman (1996b), through 
which they test the existence of gender differences in the willingness to pay for 
punishing unfair subjects. They use a punishment game, a restricted adaptation of the 
dictator game, in which subjects are given two choices, one of them is to share a 
greater amount of money with a player type A, an unfair subject as he/she had chosen 
an uneven allocation in a previously carried out experiment, while the other is to divide 
a smaller amount with a player type B, who had chosen an equal option, being a fair 
subject. With this framing players need to give up money if they want to compensate a 
fair subject. 
In this setting, the relative price of punishment varies among two treatments, to 
which subjects are randomly and equally allocated. In the first one, the price of 
punishing is relatively lower with respect to the other one. That is to say, in the latter 
subjects have to renounce to a higher amount of money in order to punish the player 
who had previously been unfair. Or, in other words, they have to sacrifice a greater 
own payoff so as to compensate the fair subject. 
Even though the setting used follows closely the setting by Eckel and Grossman 
(1996b), it includes some relevant differences. The most important one is that it is a 
survey, so the results and findings are hypothetical. Moreover, it is a computer-assisted 
survey, and it is shared online. This may be a limitation as the reached conclusions are 
not totally certain, but it might have some advantages, for instance the scope of the 
sample is wider and makes it feasible to compare the results regarding various socio-
demographic characteristics (gender, age...). The other variation is the addition of a 
third ‘relative price treatment’, that is to say, an additional condition in which the relative 
price of punishment varies; in this case it is not the amount to share with the fair player 
the one that decreases, but the money to divide with the unfair subject increases 
instead. In that way, in order to punish the unfair player and compensate the fair one, 
they have to renounce to a much higher amount (compared with the quantities 
corresponding to the two other treatments). 
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This project may contribute to corroborate the existence of concerns of fairness on 
subjects, specifically, to confirm gender differences on this issue, as well as to broaden 
the conclusions, through the implementation of the third treatment, and to obtain more 
generalised results, as the sample used may be much diverse and wide. 
In particular, the first question to be answered is whether women are more 
concerned by fairness than men, thus they will punish more the unfair behaviour. 
Moreover, a hypothesis to confirm is the one that affirms that men are not influenced by 
variations in the relative price of punishment. Furthermore, and related to the previous 
hypothesis, it will be analysed whether the variations in the relative price of punishment 
have an impact on women’s behaviour. Finally, it will be tested the idea that age affects 
the willingness to punish unfair subjects. These hypotheses are mainly derived from 
the results of the study by Eckel and Grossman (1996b), but the underlying ideas of 
gender differences with respect to altruism and fairness concerns are also found in the 
literature regarding gender differences and dictator game experiments. 
The main results obtained show a higher willingness to punish unfair behaviour for 
men than for women. This result refutes the general perception of women being less 
selfish than men. Moreover, neither men nor women are influenced by the relative price 
of punishment, so that fairness may be a principle for both of them, since they will 
either always or never be concerned with fairness motivations. In particular, their main 
decision is the one of punishing in the three treatments. Finally, older subjects are 
found to be more willing to reward fairness. 
The remaining part of the dissertation is organised as follows. In section 2 a review 
of the literature on the main topics in which it focuses is included. In section 3 the 
methodology used to carry out the analysis is explained. Section 4 shows the main 
results obtained. In section 5 some conclusions are stated. An Appendix at the end of 
the dissertation includes the survey presented to subjects. 
2. Literature review 
 
This section includes a revision of the literature about dictator game experiments as 
well as the role of gender in this kind of interaction. 
As already stated in the introduction, the behaviour of subjects playing a dictator 
game in the lab significantly differs from the theoretical equilibrium, and many 
examples which support this affirmation can be found in the literature. 
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Forsythe et al. (1994, pp.361-362) implement the dictator game in its one-shot 
version without the opportunity for subjects to see or meet their opponents, thus 
dividing them into two separate rooms, and they find that the majority of subjects 
playing the role of the dictator renounce to important shares of the available amount of 
money in order to give it to the other player. There exist different hypotheses that try to 
explain such behaviour, such as the lack of rationality of the subjects, related to 
altruism and fairness. 
In this respect, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) obtain evidence of altruism 
and fairness motivations on subjects, who are willing to give up a higher payoff for 
themselves in order to punish a player who has been selfish or unfair when deciding 
the distribution of the initially available amount of money. Specifically, in the first part of 
their article1 they try to analyse the relevance of fairness assumptions in economic 
analysis, and through three experiments they conclude that subjects are concerned 
about fairness enforcement. The first experiment is an ultimatum game in which each 
subject has to choose among a range of allocations of $10, from $9.5;$0.5 to $5;$5, 
with variations of $0.5 each time, deciding the ones that are acceptable and 
unacceptable for them. Later on, they have to make the decision of the division of the 
given amount of money between them and another subject. The results show that 
many subjects consider positive offers unacceptable, and the distributions are 
generous, contrary to the theoretical prediction.  
The second experiment consists in a dictator game divided in two parts; in the first 
one, subjects have to divide $20 with just two possible allocations: $18 for them and $2 
for the other person, or $10 for each one, while in the second one they have to share 
an amount of money with two other subjects. Regarding the payment, in the first part 
16 subjects out of 161 were randomly chosen to be paid, and the rest of them played 
the second part, in which 15 groups of 3 participants were paid, that is, 45 subjects. 
One of the possible situations in the second part of the experiment, and which is the 
most interesting case, is the one in which the player is paired with two subjects who 
behaved in a different way in the previous part of the experiment. The first one of them 
showed a fair behaviour, while the other one was unfair, that is to say, the first one 
decided to share the $20 evenly, while the second one chose the other possibility 
($18;$2). The authors call these subjects E (even) and U (uneven). The decision the 
subject has to make is to give $5 to subject E, $5 to himself/herself and nothing to 
subject U, or $6 to subject U, $6 to himself/herself and nothing to subject E. The main 
                                               
1 The authors carried out three different studies, regarding the same issue. The other two 
studies consisted of telephone surveys aimed at testing which were the community standards 
for actions affecting customers, employees and firms. 
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results are that the majority of the subjects divide the $20 evenly in the first part, and 
that they are willing to give up $1 in order to punish an unfair subject, that is to say, to 
choose the allocation ($5;$5;$0) by which the U (uneven) subject receives nothing, 
while the E (even) one, as well as the dictator get $5.  
The third experiment is the replication of the second part of the previous one, with a 
different set of subjects who are matched with a player that participated in the first part 
of the second experiment but was not paid. In this case, results are similar to the 
previously obtained. 
The main conclusions then are that fairness assumptions are relevant to subjects, 
and that there exist a willingness to punish subjects which behave unfairly even if this 
implies lower own payoffs. 
It is also important to name, in the context of ultimatum games, the main 
conclusions stated by Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003). They examine the effect of 
fairness considerations by the sensitivity of subjects to the distribution of income and 
find that identical offers in an ultimatum game steadily generate diverse rejection rates 
depending on the other available alternatives for the proposer. The authors implement 
four mini-ultimatum games, being the role of proposers and respondents randomly 
assigned to subjects. The proposer can choose between two allocations; the first one is 
the same in the four games, and the other one differs from game to game. Each 
respondent has to indicate his/her response in both decision nodes without knowing 
the choice of the proposer.  
The main result of this study is that subjects are more willing to reject an uneven 
offer when the proposer has more equitable alternatives to choose, than if the other 
possible options are more uneven, since identical actions may indicate different facts 
about the intention of the proposer. For that reason, the authors state that the utility of 
an action is very much related to the other disposable options. In this sense, a good 
fairness model should include both intentions and distributional concerns as key 
elements to explain this kind of behaviour. 
As for altruism, Eckel and Grossman (1996a, p.182) conclude in their experimental 
study that: “altruism is a motivating factor in human behaviour in general and in dictator 
games in particular”. Nevertheless, Winking and Mizer (2013) find in their natural-field 
study that altruism is not observed in dictator games when played under natural 
contexts, in fact, no player decided to share the money with the other subject when 
asked to divide an initially-given endowment. More recently, Falk and Fischbacher 
(2006) develop a theoretical model of reciprocity which states that this behaviour, that 
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is, to reciprocate to other’s decisions or acts, is a reply to a kind or unkind action. The 
authors measure the kindness degree of a response through its immediate effects and 
also through its underlying purpose. 
Regarding gender differences, there is quite a lot of recent research performed on 
this topic, due to its relevance within several fields. In fact, the spectrum covers 
numerous domains of knowledge like medicine, psychology, sociology, geography and 
economics, among others. Gender differences is a topic of great importance in the 
scientific literature, as in some situations it helps to explain the showed divergences in 
behaviour between men and women. In general terms, the observed variations in the 
performance of females and males are due to differences in personality or, more 
precisely, in the cognitive traits of the individuals. The literature on this issue shows 
relevant dissimilarities on personality among sexes. For instance, Feingold (1994) 
concludes from a meta-analysis on gender differences in personality that men show 
higher self-esteem than women, with a small difference between them, and also that 
the degree of assertiveness is generally greater in men. Moreover, women are more 
extroverted, anxious, altruistic and trustful than men. 
Differences between women and men have been analysed for a long time, and the 
general conclusion is that there exist essential divergences among them. However, in 
the last years, in the domain of psychology, a new theory has been developed, based 
on the gender similarities hypothesis, which states that, contrary to the general view, 
men and women are alike on the majority of psychological variables, but not on all of 
them. This idea has been firmly supported by Hyde (2005;2006;2014). 
In the field of economics, many experiments have been carried out concerning 
different areas and using various designs; in order to analyse the role of gender in 
economic behaviour the main aspects studied are the differences in risk attitudes and 
trust in decision-making between men and women. 
Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclude from their review of the experimental literature 
on gender differences regarding risk preferences, social preferences and competitive 
preferences that, in general terms, women are more risk averse than men, and that is 
the common result of the vast literature on the topic. For instance, Borghans et al. 
(2009) analyse gender differences regarding risk aversion but also ambiguity aversion, 
by the willingness of subjects to pay for different lotteries, using for that urns with 10 
balls, some of them yellow and the other ones blue; in some of them the distribution is 
known, while in the others it is unknown, so that in each case subjects have to bet on a 
colour. Moreover, García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2009) study 
11 
gender differences in individual decision making under ambiguity. They follow the 
methodology introduced by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002), in which 
expected payoffs increase in a linear way through four lottery-panels. Thus, this 
procedure makes feasible the analysis of the sensitivity of subjects towards these 
variations in the payoffs as an incentive to choose riskier options, that is to say, the 
sensitivity to risk premia. The same authors carry out a more recent experimental study 
in the context of employee-employer negotiations over salaries in an ultimatum game, 
and find that gender differences in these kinds of bargaining situations are not 
explained by different risk attitudes (García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-
Gutiérrez, 2012). 
Nevertheless, Eckel and Grossman (2008) state that there are some uncontrolled 
elements which might bias the results when studying gender differences with respect to 
risk aversion, like knowledge, marital status, wealth or other demographic factors. 
With respect to the second aspect, Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2003) affirm that 
men generally show higher levels of trust than women. Dittrich (2015) also finds men 
more trusting than women, and Buchan, Croson and Solnick (2008, p.472) reach the 
same conclusion.  
Gender differences have also been tested in a dictator game experimental context. 
For example, the experiments in Eckel and Grossman (1998) confirm that women are 
less selfish than men, in fact the former gave away twice as much as the latter when 
deciding as a dictator. The same result is derived from Rigdon et al. (2009) and 
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), with the restriction of the price of giving being a one-
for-one dollar transfer. Nevertheless, Bolton and Katok (1995) carry out a basic dictator 
game and find no gender differences regarding altruistic behaviour. 
Regarding reciprocity, Ben-Ner et al. (2004) conduct a two-part dictator game 
experiment, in which subjects who play the role of the recipient in the first stage are 
assigned the role of the dictator in the second stage, and they conclude that reciprocity 
is a behaviour more commonly showed by women. 
Even more, Eckel and Grossman (1996b) find that the behaviour of men is more 
stable when deciding whether to punish or not regardless of the relative price of 
punishment. Their study tries to test the existence of gender differences in the 
willingness to pay for punishing unfair subjects. For that purpose, they use a 
punishment game, that is to say, a restricted adaptation of the dictator game. Their 
framing follows that of the second part of the dictator game in Kahneman, Knetsch and 
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Thaler (1986), previously described, with the difference of subjects being matched with 
just one player, of the type chosen by the own subject.  
Let us remind some details that will be useful for our own design. Subjects in this 
experiment are told that a previous experiment had been carried out, in which subjects 
had to decide the division of $20 with two possible allocations: $18;$2, or $10;$10. A 
set of players of that game, who were not chosen to be paid, is matched with them, so 
that their decisions will determine the payoffs for the two of them. The type A player is 
the one that had chosen the first option in the previous experiment, so that it is an 
unfair subject, while the type B had chosen the other option, being a fair subject. Thus, 
under this setting, in order to compensate a fair player, subjects have to give up 
money. 
The additional factor included in this experiment is the variation of the relative price 
of punishment, by distinguishing between the Low Relative Price treatment and the 
High Relative Price treatment, being half of the subjects randomly allocated to each 
treatment. The difference between the two treatments is that, if the chosen type of 
subject is A, subjects share always evenly $12 ($6;$6), independently of the treatment, 
whereas if the chosen type is B, in the Low Relative Price treatment the amount to be 
divided is $10 ($5;$5) and in the High Relative Price treatment the amount is $8 
($4;$4). 
Regarding the results, Eckel and Grossman (1996b) find that in the High Relative 
Price treatment, 59.2% of men choose the type A subject, so that they decide not to 
punish the unfair behaviour, while in the case of women the percentage is 67.3%, and 
this difference is not significant. In the Low Relative Price treatment the pattern for men 
is similar, as 60.7% do not punish, but women differ, since most of them (64%) decide 
to punish in that case, that is, to choose the type B subject. This means that the 
decision to punish unfair behaviour by women varies depending on the relative price of 
punishment, while men behave in a similar way independent of that price.  
Moreover, the authors obtain a highly significant interaction between punishment 
choice, low and high relative price and gender. The regression results lead to the 
following statements: 1) Women are more likely than men to punish unfair behaviour. 
2) Men are not sensitive to price, they choose the type A subject independently of the 
treatment. 3) Women are price sensitive, in the High Relative Price treatment they 
mostly choose type A, while in the Low Relative Price treatment they are more likely to 
choose type B. 4) The younger the subject, the more likely he/she is to punish unfair 
behaviour. 
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The main conclusions derived from this study are that for men fairness is a principle, 
so that they will behave in the same way when facing a determined situation (in this 
case of unfairness) regardless of the price, whereas women vary their actions 
depending on the circumstances, so that they are concerned by fairness motivations, 
but regarding the price attached. So, if social norms or concerns of women differ from 
men, their behaviour in economic contexts may be different. Thus, modifications to 
some market models should be applied in order to get more accurate behaviour 
predictions. 
To sum up, the review of the literature concerning gender differences and dictator 
game experiments leads to some conclusions which can be summarized as follows: 
the dictator game is a sort of interaction in which just one of the parts has decision 
power. The SPE in this game is not reached when playing with real money. Two factors 
that may explain this behaviour are altruism and fairness motivations. In a general 
context, gender differences do exist in decision-making, mainly regarding risk-aversion 
and trust, showing that females are more averse to risk and less trustful than males. In 
a dictator game context, some differences have been found between men and women 
with respect to selfishness (or altruism), showing that women are less selfish than men. 
Also, regarding reciprocity (or punishment decisions), reciprocal behaviour is more 
frequently showed by women. 
3. Methodology 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to test the existence of gender differences related to 
fairness and altruism in the context of a dictator game, as well as to the willingness to 
punish unfair subjects. For that purpose, a survey is carried out following the structure 
of the experiment by Eckel and Grossman (1996b), which, in fact, is based on the 
setting of the second part of that by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986). 
Specifically, it is a dictator game in which each participant has to decide the type of 
subject with whom they want to play, and this decision involves a specific payoff for 
both of them, varying according to the treatment in which they are randomly allocated, 
as the relative price of punishing changes among them. In particular, subjects in the 
Low Relative Price Treatment have to choose whether to share evenly $12 with subject 
type A, or $10 with subject type B, while in the High Relative Price Treatment they have 
to make a decision on dividing the $12 with type A player, or $8 with the type B, being 
type A an unfair player and type B a fair subject. 
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As previously explained, type A and type B players correspond to a set of subjects 
who, in a previous experiment where they had to decide the division of $20 with two 
possible allocations ($18;$2-$10;$10), were not chosen to be paid, so that those ones 
who selected the first option (type A) are considered unfair, whereas the others (type 
B) are fair players. 
Even though it will be described with more detail later on, apart from other 
questions, this survey differs from the main experiment by Eckel and Grossman 
(1996b) in the fact that a third treatment is introduced in which the relative price of 
punishment varies. Specifically, it is an additional condition in which it is not the amount 
to share with the fair player the one that decreases, like in the other two treatments, but 
the amount to be divided with the unfair subject increases instead. Thus, under this 
setting, subjects have to give up a higher amount of money so as to punish the unfair 
player and compensate the fair subject.  
In order to clarify this idea, the three treatments are explained below: 
- Treatment 1: the feasible divisions are 12€ (6€;6€) with a ‘Type 1’ player or 10€ 
(5€;5€) with a ‘Type 2’ subject. 
- Treatment 2: the choice is set between 12€ (6€;6€) with a ‘Type 1’ player or 8€ 
(4€;4€) with a ‘Type 2’ subject. 
- Treatment 3: subjects have two possible allocations, the sharing of 18€ (9€;9€) 
with a ‘Type 1’ player, or the division of 10€ (5€;5€) with a ‘Type 2’ subject. 
Therefore, this framing allows for the evaluation of fairness motivations on subjects, 
as the choice of sharing an amount of money with a type B player instead of a higher 
quantity with type A indicates concerns of fairness or altruism. In fact, they are 
compensating a fair player by giving up a higher payoff for themselves; or, in other 
words, they are willing to sacrifice some money in order to punish a subject who 
behaved unfairly. 
3.1. Testable hypotheses 
Our experimental setup has been designed having in mind the following hypotheses 
to be tested: 
H1- Women are more willing to punish unfair behaviour than men. Therefore, 
women are more concerned with fairness. 
This hypothesis is directly derived from the conclusions by Eckel and Grossman 
(1996b), since they find that the probability of choosing the option of not punishing the 
unfair subject is significantly higher for men than for women. Moreover, as previously 
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shown in the literature review, women are generally found to be less selfish than men, 
a fact that supports this hypothesis.  
H2- Men’s behaviour is not affected by the relative price of punishment.  
As already stated, fairness is found to be a principle for men, so that they will either 
always or never be concerned with fairness motivations, independently of the 
circumstances surrounding the situation. That is the reason why Eckel and Grossman 
(1996b) found no variation in the decision of men in the two implemented treatments; in 
particular, they did not punish in any of them. Thus, men are expected to make the 
decision of not punishing in the three treatments that will be implemented through the 
survey.  
H3- Women are sensitive to the relative price of punishment. Women punish when 
this price is low, and will not punish for high prices of punishment. 
As the results from the experiment by Eckel and Grossman (1996b) indicate, in the 
‘Low Relative Price’ treatment ($6;$5) most women decided to punish the unfair 
behaviour, thus choosing the $5;$5 option, while in the ‘High Relative Price’ condition 
($6;$4) the majority did not punish, by selecting the $6;$6 option instead of the $4;$4 
share. In the third additional treatment they will decide not to punish since the relative 
price of doing it is really high ($9; $5). 
H4- Willingness to punish is negatively correlated with age, independently of the 
gender. 
This is a conclusion derived from the experiment by Eckel and Grossman (1996b), 
since younger subjects were more willing to punish unfair behaviour. However, the 
mean age of the subjects participating in that experiment was 21 with a standard 
deviation of four and in this survey, the age range is expected to be wider, so that the 
same conclusion may be stated, or the hypothesis may be rejected. 
3.2. Survey design 
The design of the survey includes different sections and subsections, each one with 
a number of questions, according to its purpose. All of them are required so as to 
continue answering the questionnaire. In order to control that each person can fill out 
the form just once, they are asked to log in to their google account. In that way, their 
response is linked to their account, making it impossible to access twice. 
The first section gives the general guidelines to fulfil the survey and then introduces 
the first question, which is the choice between three alternatives (A, B or C). Subjects 
are asked to choose at random one of the alternatives, since no one is better than the 
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others. In fact, this decision determines the treatment to which they are allocated, 
corresponding option A to the first treatment (12€;10€), option B to the second one 
(12€;8€) and option C to the third treatment (18€;10€). 
The following subsection corresponds to the condition linked to the selected 
alternative in the first section. Independently of the treatment, subjects are given an 
explanation of the context in which they have to make the decision, that is to say, a 
description of the previously carried out experiment, the available options for subjects 
and the existing type of subjects depending on the decision made. After that, they have 
to choose one of the two possible allocations of money, which vary among treatments. 
In the first one, they can share evenly 12€ with a subject ‘Type 1’, or 10€ with a subject 
‘Type 2’; in the second treatment they can divide equally 12€ with a ‘Type 1’ player, or 
8€ with a ‘Type 2’; and in the third one they have to choose between sharing 
symmetrically 18€ with a ‘Type 1’ or dividing 10€ with a ‘Type 2’. As previously 
explained, ‘Type 1’ player is an unfair subject and ‘Type 2’ is fair, since in the previous 
experiment the first one chose the allocation 18€;2€ when deciding the division of 20€, 
while the second one decided to share the amount evenly (10€;10€). 
This subsection allows for testing the existence of some concern for fairness by 
subjects. In fact, those who are willing to share a lower amount of money with a ‘Type 
2’ player, instead of a higher quantity with a ‘Type 1’ show an altruistic or fair 
behaviour, that is to say, they punish the unfair subject and compensate the one who 
showed a fair behaviour by giving up a higher own payoff. 
The subsequent section is a set of nineteen questions aimed at evaluating some 
personality traits on subjects, related to the main issues analysed in this dissertation, 
namely, reciprocity, fairness, trust and altruism. In particular, the possible answers to 
each one of them are: ‘Totally agree’, ‘Agree up to a point’, ‘Disagree up to a point’, or 
‘Totally disagree’. These questions make it feasible to analyse the personality of the 
subjects, and to compare it with their responses in the previous section of the survey. 
Finally, the last part of the survey includes three questions. The first one requires 
the age of the subject, the second one the gender and the third one the level of 
education (primary, secondary or tertiary). Subjects are told that the information will be 
only used for statistical purposes and that their anonymity is guaranteed. 
The Appendix at the end of the dissertation includes screenshots of the whole 
questionnaire, showing the instructions and questions presented to the subjects. 
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4. Results 
 
The first part of this section is aimed at showing some descriptive statistics which 
may help to understand the main characteristics of the sample answering the survey, 
as well as the main findings derived from their responses. 
The survey is computer-assisted, and it was shared online. Specifically, it was 
shared for the first time the 14th of March and people answered it during one month, 
being the total number of observations 128. 
As Figure 1 shows, the choice of most of them is option A in the first question, and 
option C is the least chosen. This is an interesting fact because, in order to avoid the 
selection of the first-appearing option, the question was designed in a way in which the 
possible options (A, B, C) were randomly mixed. Therefore, there were eight different 
combinations of the options order, but subjects still selected option A in most cases. 
This pattern demonstrates an existing tendency to choose the first option in a group of 
three consecutive letters, independently of the appearing order. This behaviour might 
be avoided by the use of three independent letters, for instance T, D, and S. 
Figure 1: Percentage of choice by option in the first section  
 
Figure 2 includes the number and percentage of subjects choosing a ‘Type 1’ or 
‘Type 2’ player in the treatment to which they are allocated depending on their 
response to the first question. As it can be observed, in the first two treatments the 
percentage of subjects choosing the ‘Type 2’ player is higher, that is to say, the number 
of subjects who are willing to share a lower amount (4€ or 5€) with a fair player rather 
than a higher quantity (6€) with an unfair player is greater. Nevertheless, in the third 
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treatment the percentages for each type of subject are similar, being the one 
corresponding to the ‘Type 1’ slightly higher. 
Figure 2: Percentage of choice by type of player and treatment 
  
With respect to gender, age and level of education, Figure 3 presents the 
percentage and number of women and men who answered the survey. The number of 
women (72) is higher than the number of men (56). Figure 4 shows the frequency 
distribution of the age of subjects, which varies from 14 to 67 years old. The average 
age of the sample is 36.5, the standard deviation is 14.6 and the mode is 22. Finally, 
regarding the educational level, most subjects have attained tertiary education, and a 
few have just a primary level of education (see Figure 5). 
Figure 3: Percentage (number) of subjects by gender 
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Figure 4: Frequency distribution by age 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of subjects by level of education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The responses to the different nineteen questions to be answered in order to 
evaluate some personality traits on subjects such as reciprocity, trust, fairness and 
altruism, are quite diverse. For some of the questions, the answers are either mainly 
positive or mainly negative, and there are few subjects who break the ‘general rule’. On 
the contrary, there are others for which the response is not commonly shared, and 
important differences can be found between subjects. For instance, in some of the 
questions the majority of subjects totally agree or agree up to a point (Figures 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 24), while in the rest of the questions, the 
majority totally disagree or disagree up to a point (Figures 6, 14, 16, 19 and 23). 
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Moreover, in the case of some of the questions, particularly for figures 7, 10, 11, 13, 
15, 18, 22 and 24, the majority of the responses (let us consider more than 80%) are of 
the common type (either positive or negative), whereas the others present some 
divergence (6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 23). 
In order to understand better the figures, and before showing them, the nineteen 
questions are included. The order in which they are presented corresponds to that of 
the original questionnaire, included in the appendix:  
1. If I suffer an injustice, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter the 
cost. 
2. I care about others. 
3. I anticipate the needs of others to mine. 
4. In general, I believe one can trust people. 
5. I value cooperation over competition. 
6. I am willing to incur personal costs in order to help somebody who has 
previously helped me. 
7. I believe that people have high moral principles. 
8. I strive to help somebody who has been kind to me before. 
9. I find it difficult to forgive others. 
10. I always have a good word for everyone. 
11. If somebody puts me in a difficult situation, I will do the same to him/her. 
12. I believe that most people would take advantage of others if they had the 
opportunity to do it. 
13. If someone does me a favour, I will be willing to return it to him/her. 
14. If somebody offends me or hurts me, I will do the same to him/her. 
15. I have always been completely fair to others. 
16. I believe that most people would lie in order to win or triumph. 
17. I take time out for others. 
18. Nowadays, one cannot trust anyone. 
19. In general, people act in their own interest. 
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Figure 6: Percentages by response for the question 
of revenge on an injustice 
Figure 7: Percentages by response for the question 
on care about others 
Figure 8: Percentages by response for the question 
on the anticipation of the needs of others 
Figure 9: Percentages by response for the question 
on trusting people 
Figure 10: Percentages by response for the 
question on valuing cooperation over competition 
Figure 11: Percentages by response for the 
question on reciprocity (incur personal costs) 
Figure 12: Percentages by response for the 
question on people having high moral principles 
Figure 13: Percentages by response for the 
question on reciprocity (strive to help somebody) 
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Figure 17: Percentages by response for the 
question on people taking advantage of others 
Figure 20: Percentages by response for the question 
on fairness (have always been fair to others) 
Figure 21: Percentages by response for the 
question on lying in order to win or triumph 
Figure 18: Percentages by response for the 
question on reciprocity (doing a favour) 
Figure 14: Percentages by response for the 
question on forgiveness to others 
Figure 15: Percentages by response for the 
question on having a good word for everyone 
Figure 16: Percentages by response for the 
question on negative reciprocity (difficult situation) 
Figure 19: Percentages by response for the 
question on reciprocity (offence or hurt) 
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Tables 1 and 2 show the number and percentage of subjects choosing the ‘Type 1’ 
or ‘Type 2’ player in each one of the treatments, as well as the breakdown of these 
data in two groups, namely ‘Women’ and ‘Men’. Regarding the global data, in the first 
treatment there are 60 responses, in the second one 39, and in the third one 29. As 
already stated, in treatments 1 and 2, there are more subjects who choose the ‘Type 2’ 
player rather than the other type (34-26; 25-14), while in the third treatment the choice 
of the ‘Type 1’ is higher, with a difference of just one person (15-14). With respect to 
the percentages, women’s behaviour varies among treatments, for instance, in the first 
one, half of them decide to punish, that is to say, to choose the ‘Type 2’ player and thus 
obtain a lower amount of money and, at the same time, punish the player ‘Type 1’ who 
previously behaved unfairly. In the second treatment, the percentage of women 
punishing (52.2%) is higher than the one of women who do not punish (47.8%), but it is 
in the third treatment when this difference between the chosen option greatly 
increases, being much higher the percentage of women punishing (72.7% - 27.3%). In 
the case of men, the pattern varies, as they punish more than women in the two first 
treatments (68.2% - 81.2%), and then they change their behaviour by mainly deciding 
not to punish in the third treatment (66.7%). 
Figure 22: Percentages by response for the 
question on taking time out for others 
Figure 23: Percentages by response for the 
question on trust (cannot trust anyone) 
Figure 24: Percentages by response for the question 
on selfishness (people act in their own interest) 
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Table 1: Number of subjects by gender, treatment and choice 
 
Table 2: Percentage of subjects by gender, treatment and choice 
 
The second part of this section presents the results of the regressions implemented. 
Thus, a statistical inference process is carried out, which will help to test the initial 
hypotheses. 
First of all, as the dependent variable does not follow a normal distribution (p-
value~0), the methods used are non-parametric. 
In particular, in order to test differences between groups the Pearson’s chi-squared 
test is used but, for some of the cases, as the expected frequency is really small (<5) or 
the total sample size is lower than 20, the method used is the Fisher’s exact test. 
As it can be observed in Tables 1 and 2, the percentage of women choosing the 
punishment option in the first treatment is 50%, while in the second treatment it is 
52.2%. The corresponding figures for men are 68.2% and 81.2%, respectively. The test 
for these differences shows that the relative proportions of the treatment variable are 
independent of the gender variable (p-value=0.549); that is to say, there are no 
significant differences between treatments 1 and 2 in the choice of punishing by 
gender. 
In the case of treatments 1 and 3, when comparing the percentage of women 
choosing the option of not punishing (50%; 27.3%) with the percentage of men 
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choosing that option (31.8%; 66.7%), the test confirms the existence of highly 
significant differences (p-value=0.001) between treatments and gender in the choice of 
not punishing. 
Moreover, when testing each treatment independently, for the case of treatments 1 
and 2 (p-values: 0.171; 0.093) the differences between gender in the decision of 
punishing or not are not significant. Nevertheless, in the third treatment the difference 
is significant (p-value: 0.046). 
Additionally, two regressions are carried out, the first one for treatments 1 and 2, 
and the second one for treatments 1 and 3.  
In the first case, as no significant differences are found between treatments 1 and 2, 
the regression includes the following variables:  
- Dependent variable: 
Choice        Equals if the chosen option is 6€, and 0 if it is 5€ or 4€ 
- Independent variables: 
Gender       Equals 1 if women and 0 if men 
Age       Subject’s age 
Level of education    Equals 1 if primary education, 2 if secondary and 3 if 
tertiary education 
The second regression includes two additional variables, since for treatments 1 and 
3 the results show the existence of significant differences between them by gender. 
Thus, the corresponding regression includes the variables which follow: 
- Dependent variable: 
Choice        Equals 1 if the chosen option is 5€, and 0 if it is 9€ or 6€ 
- Independent variables: 
Gender       Equals 1 if women and 0 if men 
Age       Subject’s age 
Level of education    Equals 1 if primary education, 2 if secondary and 3 if 
tertiary education 
M95        Equals 1 if men and treatment 3 
W95        Equals 1 if women and treatment 3 
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The Logit results2 of the regressions are presented below, in tables 3 and 4. 
Specifically, as Table 3 shows, the variable ‘Gender’ has a positive and significant 
coefficient, which means that men are more likely than women to punish unfair 
behaviour. In other words, the probability of choosing the 6€ option (no punishment) is 
higher for women than for men. And this is the only significant variable in the first 
regression. 
Moreover, the negative coefficient for ‘Age’ suggests that older subjects are more 
willing to reward fairness than younger subjects. And, finally, the variable ‘Level of 
education’ has a positive coefficient, which implies a lower willingness to punish unfair 
behaviour as the level of education increases. 
Table 3: Logit first regression results (Treatments 1 and 2) 
** Statistically significant at 5%** 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression for treatments 1 and 3.  
 As for the variable ‘Gender’, in this case it presents a negative (but not significant) 
coefficient, meaning that the probability of choosing the option of punishing (5€) is 
higher for men than for women. This is the same as saying that making the decision of 
not punishing (choosing either 6€ or 9€) is more probable for women than for men. 
The coefficient for ‘Age’ is positive and significant, which implies that older subjects 
are more willing to punish unfair behaviour. And the variable ‘Level of education’ shows 
a negative and not significant coefficient which, again, implies a lower willingness to 
punish unfair behaviour as the level of education increases. 
                                               
2 The regressions were also carried out using the Probit model, and the results are similar to the 
Logit results. 
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Table 4: Logit second regression results (Treatments 1 and 3) 
**Statistically significant at 5% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
Regarding the two additional variables in this regression, both are significant at a 
level of 10%, and the negative coefficient for ‘M95’ suggests that men are more willing 
to punish unfair behaviour in the first treatment than in the third treatment. And in the 
case of women, the positive coefficient for ‘W95’ indicates a higher probability of 
choosing the punishment option for women in the third treatment with respect to the 
first one.  
Having these results in mind, the hypotheses included in the dissertation to be 
tested can be now accepted or rejected: 
The null hypothesis of women being more concerned with fairness than men is 
rejected, since the result derived from the regressions, mainly from the first one, in 
which the variable ‘gender’ is significant, indicates that men are more willing to punish 
unfair behaviour than women. Thus, men are more concerned than women with 
fairness. 
Moreover, data shows that the behaviour of men does not significantly vary from 
treatment 1 to 2, being the main choice in both cases punishing, but it varies in 
treatment 3, in which the main decision is not to punish. The variable ‘M95’ included in 
the second regression shows this fact but, as its coefficient is not significant (at a 
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significance level of 5%), the hypothesis which states that men’s behaviour is not 
affected by the relative price of punishment cannot be rejected.  
Regarding the behaviour of women, it is similar in treatments 1 and 2, and the main 
choice of punishing does not vary in treatment 3 either (the percentage increases for 
this case). Moreover, the coefficient for ‘W95’ confirms this observation, and as it is not 
significant, the corresponding hypothesis is rejected. Women are not price sensitive 
when making the decision of punishing or not; in fact, their main decision is the one of 
punishing for the three treatments. 
The hypothesis related to the negative correlation between punishment decision and 
age is rejected, as the conclusion derived from both regressions is that older subjects 
are more willing to punish unfair behaviour. The significant coefficient for ‘Age’ in the 
second regression confirms this idea. 
5. Conclusions 
Gender differences has become a topic of great importance in recent years in the 
scientific literature. Quite a lot of research has been performed on it, showing 
differences in the behaviour of women and men when facing the same situation. For 
instance, in the field of economics, several experiments have been carried out 
concerning different areas, such as risk attitudes and trust, showing that women are 
more risk-averse and les trustful than men. More specifically, and in the context of a 
dictator game, evidence has been found regarding gender differences on selfishness 
(being women less selfish than men), reciprocity (a behaviour more commonly showed 
by women) and fairness or altruism (being women more concerned by fairness and 
altruism than men). 
In this dissertation, in order to test the existence of gender differences related to 
fairness and altruism in the context of a dictator game, a survey has been carried out. 
In this survey, based on the setting of the experiment by Eckel and Grossman (1996b), 
subjects faced a dictator game situation, in which they had to decide between two 
options, the first one corresponding to the even division of an amount of money with an 
unfair subject, and the second one corresponding to the even division of a lower 
quantity with a fair subject. In particular, there were three different treatments through 
which the amount to which they had to renounce in order to punish the unfair player 
increased. Under this framing, subjects had to give up money in order to compensate 
the fair subject and punish the unfair subject. Thus, it allowed testing the existence of 
gender differences on fairness and altruism motivations. 
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The results show that, contrary to the conclusions derived from Eckel and Grossman 
(1996b) and from the general literature on the topic, women are found to be more 
selfish than men, that is to say, men are more concerned by fairness and altruism 
motivations than women. 
Moreover, neither women nor men are found to be influenced by the relative price of 
punishment when making the decision of punishing or not. In this sense, fairness is a 
principle for both of them; that is to say, they will behave in the same way when facing 
a determined situation (in this case of unfairness) regardless of the price. In particular, 
they will always punish an unfair subject, regardless of the amount to which they have 
to renounce in order to do it. 
Finally, older subjects are found to be more willing to punish unfair behaviour. This 
result is, again, contrary to the one obtained by Eckel and Grossman (1996b). 
However, this finding is not unexpected, since in their experiment the mean age of the 
subjects was 21 with a standard deviation of 4 and, in this survey, it was 36.5 with a 
standard deviation of 14.6. 
The method used has some limitations, since the results from the survey are 
hypothetical, as subjects are not motivated to make their decisions by a real payoff. 
Moreover, the sample was not as large as expected; 128 subjects answered it, but the 
distribution among treatments was quite unbalanced, since for treatment 1 there were 
60 observations, for treatment 2, 39, and for treatment 3 just 29. 
For these reasons, further research could be done using this setting but 
implementing an experiment rather than a survey, in order to control for the number of 
subjects included in each one of the treatments, as well as to motivate their responses 
through a real monetary payoff.  
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Appendix: Questionnaire in original version (Spanish) 
This section includes screenshots of each part of the questionnaire, showing the 
instructions and questions presented to subjects. The questionnaire was designed 
using the tool of Google Forms, which allows to create a questionnaire including the 
sections and questions wanted, to choose the kind of responses required, as well as to 
limit the values of the possible answers and to establish obligatory questions. 
Moreover, it is able to control and limit the number of responses by subject, in fact, in 
this case each person could fill out the form just once, and so they were asked to log in 
to their google account.  
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